

HERMENEUTICAL ANALYSIS OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

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Abstract: *the presented article analyzes philosophy as a system of knowledge in the conditions of modernity, considering the latter as skillful metaphysical speculations. The article examines the ideological positions of Richard Rorty, who made an attempt to discredit philosophical knowledge from the position of criticism of epistemology and metaphysics. The significance of the demarcation of the philosophical tradition into analytical and continental through the prism of modern research optics is revealed. The fundamental role of philosophy in the methodological space of science, which is the product of thousands of years of philosophical practice, is argued. The necessity of rehabilitation of philosophy as a method of the humanities is postulated in the context of its transcendental priority in relation to alternative forms and methods of cognition.*

Keywords: *philosophy, metaphysical speculations, continental philosophy, analytical philosophy, knowledge, science.*

ГЕРМЕНЕВТИЧЕСКИЙ АНАЛИЗ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ ФИЛОСОФИИ И НАУКИ

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Аннотация: *в представленной статье производится герменевтический анализ философии и науки как форм познания мира и системы знаний в условиях современности, рассматривающей последнюю в качестве искусных метафизических спекуляций. Исследуются идейные положения Ричарда Рорти, предпринявшего попытку дискредитировать философское знание с позиции критики эпистемологии и метафизики. Раскрывается значение демаркации философской традиции на аналитическую и континентальную сквозь призму современной исследовательской оптики. Аргументируется фундаментальная роль философии в методологическом пространстве науки, являющейся продуктом тысячелетней философской практики. Постулируется необходимость реабилитации философии как метода гуманитарных наук в контексте её трансценденталистского приоритета по отношению к альтернативным формам и методам познания.*

Ключевые слова: *философия, метафизические спекуляции, континентальная философия, аналитическая философия, знание, наука.*

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Reflecting on the modern status of philosophy as a special form of knowledge of the world and a methodological construct that paves the way for the achievement of genuine knowledge, the modern philosopher is faced with a certain amount of scientific skepticism, which seeks to turn philosophy into a subject of study for a positivist-oriented science. The growing chasm of distrust towards the system of metaphysical statements that do not have a set of corresponding material equivalents shifts the focus of scientific research to the area of theoretical and idealized outlines that are not amenable to the requirements of empirical and practical registration. The abstractness of the concepts and categories used in philosophy, which have a certain evolution of the historical development of the meanings and meanings invested in them, turns the attempt of their scientific explication into a special hermeneutic labyrinth.

The British philosopher and sociologist Bertrand Russell, trying to define the specifics of philosophy as a form of knowledge of the world and a system of knowledge, places it between theology and science as a certain intermediate stage. In his work *The History of Western Philosophy*, he notes that "philosophy" is something intermediate between theology and science. Like theology, it consists in speculations about subjects about which exact knowledge has hitherto been unattainable; but like science, it appeals to human reason rather than to authority, whether it be the authority of tradition or revelation" [1, p. 22]. Such an approach is extremely superficial, since it completely vainly equates the methodology of religious and philosophical knowledge, the diametricality of which is revealed upon closer examination of their logic.

The history of the justification of theological concepts is closely connected with the involvement of the methodological apparatus of the system of philosophical argumentation, which is most clearly expressed in the ideological guidelines of the Christian theologian Aurelius Augustine. Five proofs of the existence of the existence of God, which he cites as a justification for the canonical provisions of Christianity, are universal rational-logical arguments belonging to the methodological body of philosophy. The involvement of philosophical methodology in

order to substantiate the reliability of Christian dogmas is self-destructive, since faith, as the quintessence and imperative condition of any dogmatics, does not imply the existence of a system of evidence in its basis. Based on the fundamental content, methodological and semantic difference between the categories "faith" and "knowledge" diametrically opposed to each other, the location of philosophy as an intermediate link is erroneous. The appeal of the category of "faith" and "dogma" to the object of scientific and rational discussion in order to identify a certain epistemological reliability fundamentally undermines the essence of religious provisions that have an irrational nature of orientation. In the structural chain of the logically consistent arrangement of three different forms of knowledge of the world declared by B. Russell,

The desire to discard philosophy, limiting itself to the horizon of the influence of science, undertaken by the Bolsheviks in the 20s of the 20th century, and later by the supporters of technocracy in the 21st century, led to a catastrophic crisis of culture, expressed in worldview upheavals, as well as the loss of guidelines and models in the construction of axiological coordinates. However, such a provocative and demonstrative refusal did not at all exclude the philosophical basis from the space of science, but confirmed their inseparable unity and complementarity. The formation of a certain philosophical thesaurus, which is a receptacle of concepts and categories that have entered the history of the philosophical tradition, contributes to the establishment of a certain "philosophical language", the rules of understanding of which are structurally and semantically built into the hermeneutic apparatus of philosophy. Thus, understanding and disclosing the content of the definitions of fundamental categories is impossible from the standpoint of the terminological apparatus of related humanities, which catastrophically complicates the process of interpreting the latter for researchers of a different humanitarian orientation [2, p. 34]. This circumstance, revealing the closed nature of the interpretation of concepts and categories within the framework of the research prism in which they are generated, testifies not only to the autonomy of the philosophical system, but also to the irreducibility of its structural elements to something,

In this regard, the content and significance of the categorical apparatus of philosophy cannot be expressed by any other science, despite the fact that any scientific discipline has a solid philosophical foundation in its denominator. This irreducibility, expressed in the impossibility of a relevant conversion of philosophical categories into the categories of classical science, anticipates the problem of searching for the relationship between philosophy and science, as well as raising questions about identifying the criteria for scientific knowledge, which represents an undeniable epistemological ideal. J. Habermas, being in solidarity with the ideological principles of the philosophy of pragmatism, sought to discredit the transcendentalist philosophy of philosophy, arguing: "philosophy, even if it is removed from the problematic role of a pointer to a place and a judge, still can, and should, retain its claims to rationality, performing more modest functions of *locum tenens* and interpreter" [3].

Habermas, carrying out a methodological revision of the entire history of the philosophical tradition, cites three forms of "farewell to philosophy", in the context of therapeutic, heroic and salvatory. By therapeutic farewell, the philosopher means the factor of philosophy turning against itself, expressed in the complication and heaping of the language with a specific system of linguosemantic constructions, aggravating the position of the epistemological and epistemological component. The heroic form of farewell is understood as the formation of false mental patterns that have abstract metaphysical images that have no contact with reality. The epochal nature of the heroic form of farewell causes not only a dramatic farewell to philosophy, but "carries something from Hölderlin's pathos of salvation in the face of the greatest danger" [3, p. 15].

Habermas understands the rise of the hermeneutic approach in the neo-Aristotelian context as a salvatory farewell to philosophy, where certain successes are noticeable in the framework of criticizing the classical requirements for the systematic nature of philosophical knowledge, which does not meet the needs of the modern post-non-classical stage in the development of science, focused on anticipating the ideal of stochasticity and uncertainty. Philosophy's loss of its transcendental status, which allows it to act as the supreme arbiter, is due to the strengthening of the position of positivism that arose in the 19th century in the person of his brightest ancestor - the French sociologist and philosopher Auguste Comte, who considers philosophical knowledge as a certain imitation of science. The criticism that came down accused philosophy of a methodological claim related to its inherent tendency of speculative theorizations, which are considered by representatives of positivism as a caricature of truth.

The absence of a quantitative component in philosophy, which refers to the involvement in the methodological apparatus of the latest system of mathematical calculations and models, as well as empirical tools for fixing certain qualitative components of observation, was the basis for the decision of the total elimination of science from philosophy. However, despite the obvious validity of the accusations presented by the positivists, it was impossible to exclude the philosophical background due to the epistemological, semantic, functional and structural integrity of the categories of science, grown on the basis of philosophical abstractness. Despite the unsuccessful experience of discrediting philosophical knowledge undertaken by representatives of positivism and neopositivism, as well as the attempts of the post-positivist school to rehabilitate philosophy in relation to its scientific and heuristic value, attempts at a critical attack on the latter have not lost their relevance. Hence the desire to conduct a large-scale demarcation of philosophy into two fundamental oppositional styles: continental and analytical (Anglo-American), around which the largest philosophical trends have formed.

The American philosopher Richard Rorty, being a representative of neopragmatism and the analytical tradition of philosophy in his well-known work "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature", notes the significant contribution of Immanuel Kant, which consists in separating science from philosophy, turning the theory of knowledge into their

common and universal denominator. Rorty's categories of consciousness, intuition, spiritual and bodily substances act as an object of criticism of philosophical knowledge, which, according to the philosopher, have no contact with reality and only move the philosopher away from the truth, creating a chain of additional metaphysical constructions [4, c. 28]. In this regard, Rorty insists on the specificity of considering certain abstractions through the prism of phenomena that arise as a result of social interactions. The notion of the arbitrariness of philosophical knowledge,

According to Rorty, the difference between science and philosophy lies in the fact that in the first there is a continuity of problems and observed progress in their consistent resolution, while in the second there is no progress in deepening knowledge, but a cumulative component is found in relation to the proliferation of various ideas. The alignment of coordinates aimed at pointing philosophy on the right path, undertaken by Kant, according to Rorty, contributed to the placement of the outer space of philosophy into the inner space of "the space of the activity of the transcendental ego, then proclaiming Cartesian certainty regarding the internal for the laws of what was previously thought to be external" [4].

Kant managed to establish a certain consensus of the Cartesian position, characterized by the reliability of exclusively subjective observations with the circumstance of what is already present as a priori knowledge. Philosophy, with the advent of Kant, according to Rorty, sought to create an indifferent frame of culture, determined by a certain requirement to distinguish between those areas of science that occupy a trajectory that is safe in terms of scientific criteria. This circumstance assigns to philosophy the role of a demarcation tool - a vigilant guard that separates the scientific forms of cognition of the world from non-scientific ones, oriented towards an irrational way of cognizing the world. Such an approach deprives philosophy of its heuristic function, calling into question the epistemological and methodological components, which is a completely absurd and unreasonable remark of a philosopher who refers to the methodological tools of philosophy for its subsequent criticism. The paradox of criticism of philosophy in an effort to further discredit lies in the use of its own methods and means, which is already a mutual exclusion and a logical contradiction. This circumstance emphasizes the recognition of the absolute dependence and complementarity of philosophy and science as forms of cognition of the world, anticipating the reliability of the dialectical concept of the correlation of the philosophy of science.

The dialectical concept of the relationship between philosophy and science recognizes the close relationship between universal philosophical and particular scientific knowledge, abandoning the widespread tendency to oppose them. The need to debunk the misconceptions associated with the inconsistency of philosophy is determined not by the moral guidelines of philosophers to defend their professional fortress, but, above all, by the identification of the logical inconsistency of claims that acquire the character of alternative philosophical concepts. Thus, the relationship between philosophy and science is characterized by the symbiotic nature of their interaction, expressed in the active synthesis of the resources contained in each other: concepts, methods, approaches, forms and means.

The establishment of a consensus between philosophical and particular scientific knowledge is characterized by the requirement of their mutual complementarity and unity, which is reflected in the philosophical understanding of the activities and results of scientific discoveries. The philosophical patronage of science will make it possible to avoid the existence of many topical problems associated with the anthropogenic impact of man on the environment, the growth of political and military collisions, economic and acute social upheavals. The structural model of philosophy, therefore, can be represented as an epistemological background, a certain electromagnetic field, within which individual particular sciences, like iron filings, line up in accordance with the trajectory of lines of force, forming a stable structuralist pattern.

The history of the formation and development of science is the history of philosophy in the formation of not only a certain methodology, but also the criteria of reliability, which science has completely recklessly appropriated to itself as its own offspring. However, the impact of philosophy on science, expressed in a change in the types of scientific rationality and the search for new foundations of truth, which tend to collapse as a result of the accumulation of an excessive number of anomalies in science, demonstrates the undeniable supremacy of philosophy over science, which is the main source and method of comprehending the truth.

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